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Entanglement swapping between Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen
(EPR) pairs can be used to generate the same sequence of ran-
dom bits in two remote places. A quantum key distribution
protocol based on this idea is described. The scheme exhibits
the following features. (a) It does not require that Alice and
Bob choose between alternative measurements, therefore im-
proving the rate of generated bits by transmitted qubit. (b)
It allows Alice and Bob to generate a key of arbitrary length
using a single quantum system (three EPR pairs), instead
of a long sequence of them. (c) Detecting Eve requires the
comparison of fewer bits. (d) Entanglement is an essential
ingredient. The scheme assumes reliable measurements of the
Bell operator.
PACS numbers: 03.67.Dd, 03.67.Hk, 03.65.Bz
The two main goals of cryptography are for two distant
parties, Alice and Bob, to be able to communicate in a
form that is unintelligible to a third party, Eve, and to
prove that the message was not altered in transit. Both
of these goals can be accomplished securely if both Al-
ice and Bob are in possession of the same secret ran-
dom sequence of bits, a “key” [1]. Therefore, one of the
main problems of cryptography is the key distribution
problem, that is, how do Alice and Bob, who initially
share no secret information, come into the possession of
a secret key, while being sure that Eve cannot acquire
even partial information about it. This problem cannot
be solved by classical means, but it can be solved us-
ing quantum mechanics [2]. The security of protocols for
quantum key distribution (QKD) such as the Bennett-
Brassard 1984 (BB84) [2], E91 [3], B92 [4], and other
protocols [5,6], is assured by the fact that while informa-
tion stored in classical form can be examined and copied
without altering it in any detectable way, it is impossible
to do that when information is stored in unknown quan-
tum states, because an unknown quantum state cannot
be reliably cloned (“no-cloning” theorem [7]). In these
protocols security is assured by the fact that both Al-
ice and Bob must choose randomly between two possible
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measurements. In this paper I introduce a QKD scheme
which does not require that Alice and Bob choose be-
tween alternative measurements. This scheme is based
on “entanglement swapping” [8–10] between two pairs of
“qubits” (quantum two-level systems), induced by a Bell
operator measurement [11]. The Bell operator is a non-
degenerate operator which acts on a pair of qubits i and
j, and projects their combined state onto one of the four
Bell states
|00〉ij =
1√
2
(
|0〉i ⊗ |0〉j + |1〉i ⊗ |1〉j
)
, (1)
|01〉ij =
1√
2
(
|0〉i ⊗ |0〉j − |1〉i ⊗ |1〉j
)
, (2)
|10〉ij =
1√
2
(
|0〉i ⊗ |1〉j + |1〉i ⊗ |0〉j
)
, (3)
|11〉ij =
1√
2
(
|0〉i ⊗ |1〉j − |1〉i ⊗ |0〉j
)
. (4)
Entanglement swapping works as follows. Consider a pair
of qubits, i and j, prepared in one of the four Bell states,
for instance, |11〉ij . Consider a second pair of qubits k
and l prepared in another Bell state, for instance, |01〉kl.
If a Bell operator measurement is performed on i and k,
then the four possible results “00,” “01,” “10,” and “11”
have the same probability to occur. In fact, the outcome
of each measurement is purely random. Suppose that the
result “00” is obtained, consequently the state of the pair
i and k after the measurement is |00〉ik. Moreover, the
state of j and l is projected onto state |10〉jl. Therefore,
the state of j and l becomes entangled although they
have never interacted.
I will denote the initial state of the pairs i, j and k, l,
in the previous example by |11〉ij ⊗ |01〉kl, and the final
state of the pairs i, k and j, l by |00〉ik ⊗ |10〉jl. Suppose
that the initial state of the pairs i, j and k, l is a product
of two Bell states and, as in the previous example, a Bell
operator measurement is executed on two qubits, one of
each pair; then, after the measurement the state of the
pairs i, k and j, l becomes a product of two Bell states.
All possibilities are collected in Table I.
The proposed scheme for QKD is illustrated in Fig. 1
and it is described as follows.
(i) Consider six qubits numbered 1 to 6. Alice prepares
qubits 1 and 2 in the Bell state |11〉
12
, and qubits 3 and 5
in the Bell state |10〉
35
. In a remote place, Bob prepares
qubits 4 and 6 in the Bell state |10〉
46
. All this informa-
tion is public. 2 and 6 will be the only transmitted qubits
during the process. Alice will always retain qubits 1, 3,
and 5; and Bob will always retain qubit 4.
1
(ii) Alice transmits qubit 2 to Bob using a public chan-
nel. This channel must be a transmission medium that
isolates the state of the qubit from interactions with the
environment.
(iii) Alice secretly measures the Bell operator on qubits
1 and 3, and Bob secretly measures the Bell operator
on qubits 2 and 4. The results of both experiments are
correlated, although Alice and Bob do not know how as
yet. The purpose of the next step is to elucidate how the
results are correlated without publicly revealing either of
them.
(iv) Bob transmits qubit 6 to Alice using a public chan-
nel. Then Alice measures the Bell operator on qubits 5
and 6, and publicly announces the result. Suppose that
Alice has obtained “11” in her secret measurement on
qubits 1 and 3. Then, since the initial state of 1, 2, 3,
and 5 was |11〉
12
⊗ |10〉
35
, by using Table I Alice knows
that the state of 2 and 5 is |10〉
25
. In addition, suppose
that Alice obtains “00” in the public measurement on 5
and 6. Then, since she knows that the previous state of
2, 4, 5, and 6 was |10〉
25
⊗ |10〉
46
, by using Table I Alice
knows that Bob has obtained “00” in his secret measure-
ment on 2 and 4. Following a similar reasoning, Bob can
know that Alice has obtained “11” in her secret measure-
ment on 1 and 3. Previously, Alice and Bob have agreed
to choose the sequence of results of Alice’s secret mea-
surements to form the key. The two initial bits of the
key are therefore “11.” The public information shared
by Alice and Bob is not enough for Eve to acquire any
knowledge of the result obtained by one of the parts.
Using this information Eve only knows that one of the
following four possible combinations of results for Alice
and Bob’s secret measurements have occurred: “00” for
Alice’s result and “11” for Bob’s, “01” and “10,” “10”
and “01,” and “11” and “00.”
One Bell state can be transformed into another just
by rotating one of the qubits. Using this property, Alice
(Bob) can change the Bell state of qubits 1 and 3 (2 and
4) to a previously agreed public state. Then the situation
is similar to (i) and the next stage of the process can be
started.
This scheme for QKD has the following features.
(a) It improves the rate of generated bits by trans-
mitted qubit. In BB84 and in B92 (and in E91), Bob
(and Alice) must choose between two alternative mea-
surements in order to preserve security. This implies
that the number of useful random bits shared by Alice
and Bob by transmitted qubit, before checking for eaves-
dropping, is 0.5 bits by transmitted qubit, both in BB84
and B92 (and 0.25 in E91), or at the most, it can be
made to approach 1 in Ref. [6]. In our scheme the rate is
1 bit by transmitted qubit. This is so because Alice and
Bob always perform the same kind of measurement, a
Bell operator measurement, and therefore, each of them
acquires two correlated random bits after each stage of
the process. In each of these stages, only two qubits are
transmitted (one from Alice to Bob and another from
Bob to Alice). This improvement is very useful since a
key must be as large as the message to be transmitted
(written as a sequence of bits), and cannot be reused for
subsequent messages [1].
(b) It only requires a single quantum system (three
EPR pairs) instead of a long sequence of quantum sys-
tems, to generate a key of arbitrary length. By con-
trast with previous schemes, in the one presented here no
source of qubits is needed. The same two qubits (qubits
2 and 6) are transmitted to and from Alice and Bob over
and over again [12].
(c) The detection of Eve requires the comparison of
fewer bits. The transmitted qubits do not encode the bits
that form the key, but only the type of correlation be-
tween the results of the experiments that allow Alice and
Bob to secretly generate the key. Therefore, intercept-
ing and copying them does not allow Eve to acquire any
information about the key. In fact, the state of the trans-
mitted qubits is public. However, Eve can use a strategy
—also based on entanglement swapping— to learn Alice’s
sequence of secret results. This strategy is illustrated in
Fig. 2 and is described as follows.
(1a) Consider the same scenario as in (i) but suppose
Eve has two additional qubits 7 and 8, initially prepared
in a Bell state, for instance, |00〉
78
.
(1b) Eve intercepts qubit 2 that Alice send to Bob and
makes a Bell operator measurement on qubits 2 and 8.
Then qubits 1 and 7 become entangled in a known (to
Eve) Bell state. For instance, if after Eve’s measurement
the state of 2 and 8 is |00〉
28
, then the state of 1 and 7
becomes |11〉
17
.
(2) Therefore, after Eve’s intervention the real situa-
tion is not that described in (ii). Now qubit 1 is entangled
with Eve’s qubit 7, and 2 is entangled with Eve’s 8.
(3a) In this new scenario, after Alice’s (Bob’s) mea-
surement on qubits 1 and 3 (2 and 4), the state of qubits
5 and 7 (6 and 8) becomes a Bell state. For instance,
if Alice (Bob) obtains “11” (“00”), the state of qubits 5
and 7 (6 and 8) would be |10〉
57
(|10〉
68
). However, these
states are unknown to Eve, because she (still) does not
know the results of Alice’s and Bob’s measurements.
(3b) Eve intercepts qubit 6 that Bob sends to Alice and
makes a Bell operator measurement on qubits 6 and 8.
This reveals the state they were in. Then Eve can know
Bob’s result. For instance, in our example, Eve would
find “10” and would know that Bob’s result was “00.”
(3c) Eve makes a Bell operator measurement on qubits
7 and 8. Then qubits 5 and 6 becomes entangled in a Bell
state (still) unknown to Eve, because she does not know
Alice’s secret result. For instance, if Eve obtains “01,”
then qubits 5 and 6 would be in the state |01〉
56
.
(4) Eve gives qubit 6 to Alice. Alice makes a measure-
ment on 5 and 6 and announces the result. Then Eve
can know the previous state of 5 and 7 (|10〉
57
, in our
example) and the result of Alice’s measurement on 1 and
2
3 (“11,” in our example).
However, Eve’s intervention changes the correlation
that Alice and Bob expect between their secret results.
For instance, in our example, Bob, using his result and
the result publicly announced by Alice, thinks that the
two initial bits of the key are “10.”
As in previous QKD protocols, in our scheme Alice and
Bob can detect Eve’s intervention by publicly comparing
a sufficiently large random subset of their sequences of
bits, which they subsequently discard. If they find that
the tested subset is identical, they can infer that the re-
maining untested subset is also identical, and therefore
can form a key. In BB84, for each bit tested by Alice and
Bob, the probability of that test revealing the presence
of Eve (given that Eve is indeed present) is 1
4
. Thus, if
N bits are tested, the probability of detecting Eve (given
that she is present) is 1−(3
4
)N
. In our scheme if Alice and
Bob compare a pair of bits generated in the same step,
the probability for that test to reveal Eve is 3
4
. Thus if n
pairs (N = 2n bits) are tested, the probability of Eve’s
detection is 1−(1
2
)N
. This improvement in the efficiency
of the detection of eavesdropping has been pointed out
for a particular eavesdropping attack, it would be inter-
esting to investigate whether more general attacks exist
and whether the improvement in efficiency is also present
in these cases.
(d) It uses entanglement as an essential tool. QKD was
the first practical application of quantum entanglement
[3]. However, as shown in Ref. [13], entanglement was not
an essential ingredient, in the sense that almost the same
goals can be achieved without entanglement. However,
subsequent striking applications of quantum mechanics
such as quantum dense coding [14,15], teleportation of
quantum states [8,16,17], entanglement swapping [8,9],
and quantum computation [18], are strongly based on
quantum entanglement. The scheme described here relies
on entanglement in the sense that it performs a task —
QKD with properties (a), (b), and (c)— that cannot be
accessible without entanglement.
The practical feasibility of the scheme described in this
paper hinges on the feasibility of a reliable (i.e., with
100% theoretical probability of success) Bell operator
measurement. Bell operator measurements are also re-
quired for reliable double density quantum coding and
teleportation. As far as I know, the first proposals for a
reliable Bell operator measurement are those which dis-
criminate between the four polarization-entangled two-
photon Bell states using entanglement in additional de-
grees of freedom [19] or using atomic coherence [20].
It is not expected that the protocol for QKD intro-
duced in this paper will be able to improve existing ex-
periments [21] for real quantum cryptography in practice.
Its main importance is conceptual: it provides a different
quantum solution to a problem already solved by quan-
tum mechanics.
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Initial state |ijkl〉 Possible final states |ikjl〉
0000 0101 1010 1111 0000 0101 1010 1111
0001 0100 1011 1110 0001 0100 1011 1110
0010 0111 1000 1101 0010 0111 1000 1101
0011 0110 1001 1100 0011 0110 1001 1100
TABLE I. All possible results of a Bell operator measurement
on qubits i and k. For example, if the initial state is |11〉
ij
⊗
|01〉
kl
, you must locate 1101 on the left half of the table.
Then, after a Bell operator measurement on i and k, the four
possible final states are represented on the right half of the
table by 0010, 0111, 1000, and 1101; where, for instance, 0010
means |00〉
ik
⊗ |10〉
jl
.
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FIG. 1. QKD scheme based on entanglement swapping. The
bold lines connect qubits in Bell states, the dashed lines con-
nect qubits on which a Bell operator measurement is made,
and the pointed lines connect qubits in Bell states induced
by entanglement swapping. “00” means that the Bell state
|00〉 is public knowledge, (00) means that it is only known
to Alice, [00] means that it is only known to Bob, |00| means
that it is unknown to all the parts, [(00)] means that it is only
known to Alice and Bob, etc.
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FIG. 2. Eve’s strategy to obtain Alice’s secret result. {00}
means that the Bell state |00〉 is only known to Eve. The
remaining notation is the same as in Fig. 1.
5
